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Title: November 6, 2025

GRAY ZONE BRIEF 6 NOVEMBER 2025

GZB TOP THREE

U.S. CARIBBEAN OPERATIONS

Since Sept. 2, the United States has widened its use of kinetic force against maritime drug routes in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. To date, the campaign has eliminated more than a dozen suspected trafficker boats and killed more than 60 crew. In doing so, the U.S. has effectively militarized counternarcotics policy across two hemispheric corridors – a dramatic escalation from traditional interdictions.

Because the campaign is only two months old, the data remain too preliminary to reveal any measurable effect on drug flow or consumption. Historically, interdiction alone has rarely affected systemic supply; even the large-scale seizures and airstrikes conducted as part of Plan Colombia in the 2000s only displaced smuggling routes rather than reducing total drug exports. Lasting disruption will likely depend on whether the U.S. extends pressure beyond open-sea engagements to the infrastructure that sustains the trade, including the non-state ports, clandestine airstrips and illicit fuel storage networks that enable transshipment across the Caribbean and eastern Pacific.

Concentrating around Venezuela, Colombia and the Central American corridor, the U.S. campaign functions as both interdiction and signaling – underscoring U.S. willingness to assert control over hemispheric transit routes. Its strategic value, however, will hinge on whether deterrence endures once the strikes subside.

RUSSIA, AZERBAIJAN & ARMENIA

Building connections. A train carrying Russian wheat is on its way to Armenia via Azerbaijan, following Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s lifting of restrictions on cargo transit from his country to Armenia. A spokesperson for the Armenian prime minister said the development was in line with the agreement reached in Washington in August to resolve the border dispute between the two countries. Meanwhile, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said Yerevan is still in talks with Washington on construction of a railway between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan, through Armenian territory.

SOUTH CAUCUSES

Russian inclusion. Relatedly, at a meeting in Moscow of the security chiefs of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu stressed the “regional dimensions” of the peace process in the South Caucasus. He therefore emphasized the need to revive the so-called 3+3 format, involving the three South Caucasus countries and Russia, Iran and Turkey.

MIDDLE EAST SITREP

ISRAEL & INDIA

Security matters. Israel and India held defense talks in Tel Aviv, co-chaired by both countries’ defense ministers. They signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation, focused on training, defense industrial cooperation, science and technology, research and development, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity.

• Iran-Belarus Defense Cooperation: Iran may seek to exchange technical information with Belarus related to air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment to enhance its ability to produce these systems. Belarus produces components compatible with advanced systems that Iran has sought to acquire from Russia.

• Hezbollah Reconstitution: Israel is reportedly preparing plans for a possible multi-day operation targeting Hezbollah leadership and infrastructure across Lebanon amid Hezbollah’s efforts to reconstitute its forces. Discussions in Israeli media about a new IDF operation in Lebanon follow several recent reports from Israeli and Western sources that Hezbollah is reconstituting its forces and weapons capabilities in Lebanon through domestic production and smuggling.

• Hezbollah Reconstitution: Israeli and US officials have recently warned the Lebanese government that Israel’s possible operation in Lebanon would be a direct consequence of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) failure to address continued Hezbollah reconstitution, probably in part to pressure the Lebanese state to take more aggressive steps to disarm Hezbollah.

EGYPT & LEBANON

Moving ahead. Egypt will soon begin exporting natural gas to Lebanon via the Arab Gas Pipeline following the U.S. Congress’ suspension of sanctions on Syria. The restrictions had previously blocked implementation of a gas supply agreement signed in 2022 between Cairo, Beirut and Damascus. Egypt is now expected to deliver 650 million cubic meters of natural gas to Lebanon annually through this pipeline, parts of which are still being built.

RUSSIA & IRAQI OIL

Sanctions disruption. Iraq’s state-owned SOMO canceled three shipments of crude oil to Russia’s Lukoil in November due to U.S. sanctions announced last month against major Russian oil firms. Lukoil owns a 75 percent stake in Iraq's West Qurna-2 oil field, which was set to provide the oil for the shipments.

IRAN

Iranian influence. Iran has stepped up its support of pro-Iranian groups in Iraq, preparing them for a possible attack against Israel, Israeli media reported. Tehran has focused on supplying these groups with more advanced weaponry and training militants in waging war against Israel if an escalation occurs. The commander of Iran’s Quds Force reportedly recently visited Iraq to meet with senior militant leaders.

GLOBAL SITREP

RUSSIA & TURKEY

Contract negotiations. Turkey and Russia are negotiating an extension of their natural gas supply agreements. According to Bloomberg, contracts between Russia’s Gazprom and Turkey’s BOTAS for the supply of up to 21.75 billion cubic meters of gas per year are set to expire at the end of 2025. The talks focus on maintaining similar supply volumes in the future. Turkey has been a key market for Gazprom since the company lost most of its European customers following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR

Ukrainian attack. An oil refinery at Russia’s Black Sea port of Tuapse has stopped processing fuel following Ukrainian drone attacks on Nov. 2. The Rosneft-controlled facility reportedly suspended operations the following day due to damage to port infrastructure.

Iran and China. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke by phone with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. They discussed bilateral relations and recent regional developments, as well as Iran’s nuclear program.

AMERIKASTAN

Central Asian affairs. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution on deepening the partnership between the United States and the countries of Central Asia, ahead of the so-called C5+1 leaders’ summit in Washington on Thursday. The resolution reaffirms the strategic importance of the format in strengthening regional sovereignty, stability and shared security interests with the United States.

NATO

Russia vs. NATO. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko accused NATO of training for a blockade of Russia’s Kaliningrad region. Grushko said the training took place during recent NATO exercises, which also highlighted the region’s increasing militarization. Given these developments, dialogue to reduce tensions is becoming increasingly difficult, he added.

CHINA

China and Georgia. Chinese Premier Li Qiang met in Shanghai with Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, who is in China for an international trade expo. Both leaders expressed interest in strengthening cooperation on trade, investment and other fields.

GZB ECONOMIC INTSUM: Ranked: The World’s Wealthiest Nations in 2025

Key Takeaways:

• Liechtenstein is the richest country worldwide, with a GDP per capita of $213,713.

• Average earnings exceed $100,000 in Luxembourg, Ireland, and Switzerland.

Today, seven of the top 10 wealthiest nations per capita are in Europe, characterized by their small populations and strong social welfare systems.

While examining wealth is difficult to truly measure, one common measure is GDP per capita, which divides an economy’s total output by the number of its citizens. By this metric, America ranks eighth globally, with average earnings of $89,599 per person.

This graphic shows the countries with the highest GDP per capita in 2025, based on data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook October Update.

With a GDP per capita of $213,713, Liechtenstein ranks highest globally.

Nearly 60% of Liechtenstein’s workforce are commuters, which significantly inflates the country’s average earnings. Similarly, second-ranking Luxembourg has a large share of its workforce that live in neighboring countries.

Ireland comes in third, with average earnings of $129,132. Many big tech companies—from Google to Meta—have their European headquarters in the country thanks to its favorable tax regime, further boosting GDP per capita.

Switzerland, Iceland, and Singapore follow next in line, each with average earnings less impacted by generous tax policies or commuters. In particular, average earnings in Singapore have ballooned 19-fold since 1980 driven by the nation’s transformation into a global hub for finance and trade.

GZB INFOCUS: THE UAE MILITARIZING THE RED SEA

The Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group that comprises one side of the civil war in Sudan, recently took el-Fasher, the last important stronghold of the country’s military in western Sudan. The victory – and the massacre that followed – would have been impossible without foreign support. Multiple intelligence assessments suggest that that support came from the United Arab Emirates. And though Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied its involvement, satellite imagery, flight patterns and arms tracking networks have repeatedly indicated Emirati involvement in Sudan through direct shipments and proxy channels.

Recent satellite analysis adds to the intrigue. On three small uninhabited Red Sea islets, monitoring agencies have detected the covert construction of runways capable of handling medium-sized cargo aircraft. No country has claimed responsibility for them, but experts believe the construction methods, materials, procurement routes and logistics all point to Emirati involvement. Moreover, the construction projects resemble known Emirati military projects in Eritrea, the island of Socotra and Libya.

Beyond Africa, similar patterns emerge in Abu Dhabi’s approach to military partnerships. The Financial Times recently reported that U.S. intelligence concluded in 2022 that the UAE had transferred dual-use technologies to China through a company tied to its national security adviser. The systems allegedly enhance range and targeting capacities in Chinese missile programs, potentially allowing Chinese hardware to outclass their U.S. counterparts.

It's tempting to interpret Emirati activity here as little more than a regional power hedging its bets across conflict zones. But the truth is that this is a much more considered military-economic project spanning the Red Sea corridor, a crucial maritime chokepoint through which roughly 10 percent of global maritime trade passes. From a purely strategic perspective, Emirati infrastructure here is less about outright power projection and more about logistics, surveillance and deniability. For Abu Dhabi, securing strategic resources and becoming a central geopolitical player is driving a different kind of power projection – one that balances Western alliances with its own ambitions of securing long-term technological and economic independence.

Over the past decade, Emirati business networks and security contractors have expanded financing channels throughout Africa. Investments have been funneled to mining operations in Sudan and Congo, port developments including in Somaliland and Puntland, logistics hubs from Eritrea to Mozambique, and land acquisition and agricultural activities in Zambia and Zimbabwe. From these engagements, a pattern emerges: Abu Dhabi is blending commercial activity with paramilitary facilitation in a form of grey zone operations – that is, operations that fall between economic diplomacy and direct military intervention.

In Sudan, the UAE has essentially built a patron‑client relationship with the Rapid Support Forces. In fact, their partnership predates the 2023 civil war. Since 2017, the RSF has sent thousands of Sudanese fighters to serve as mercenaries in Yemen on behalf of the UAE. The group controls most of Sudan’s artisanal gold mining in Darfur, feeding gold exports routed through Chad and Libya to the UAE, which has become a global gold refining hub. By sustaining this economic pipeline, the UAE profits from and secures leverage over Sudan’s political future.

The arrangement has the UAE sending arms and ammunition from its bases in Chad, in Libya and across land corridors from Somalia to Darfur. It has also paid the salaries of Colombian mercenaries fighting for the RSF after being recruited under the guise of guarding oil facilities in the UAE. These mercenaries were heavily involved in the siege of el-Fasher and the training of the troops they assisted. For Abu Dhabi, the calculation is simple: secure access to the billions of dollars’ worth of Sudanese gold and create a loyal paramilitary force that can safeguard its interests – all while minimizing exposure or direct involvement.

Abu Dhabi officially withdrew troops from Yemen in 2019, but it maintains de facto control over strategic ports and islands including Aden, Mukalla, Socotra and Perim. During Yemen’s civil war, the UAE initially aligned with Saudi Arabia as part of the anti-Houthi coalition but later broke rank, redirecting support to southern separatists to secure access to coastal zones and ports. The new island runways serve a dual purpose of being logistical hubs to support both southern separatists and other proxies in Africa. They have the added benefit of securing maritime corridors through the Red Sea and maintaining influence over the Bab el-Mandeb strait.

Through its two mega companies, DP World and AD Ports Group, the UAE has significantly expanded port operations throughout Africa, winning concessions in places like Angola, the Republic of Congo and the breakaway region of Somaliland. Bilateral ties are especially pronounced in Somalia and Somaliland; activity has expanded through port management and airstrip construction to direct military cooperation, including training troops, paying salaries and supplying equipment. In Somaliland, the UAE has secured operational control over the port of Berbera and is developing a military airbase capable of hosting Emirati aircraft and naval deployments.

In Puntland – another breakaway region of Somalia – Emirati officers have trained and financed elements of the Puntland Maritime Police Force, a coastal security unit nominally under local control but effectively reliant on Emirati funding, equipment and operational oversight. The Colombian mercenaries present in Sudan mobilize in Bosaso, a port and airstrip developed with a 30-year concession by Dubai-based P&O Ports. The strategic location of the breakaway region and its relative independence make it another ideal operational base for the UAE.

Relations with the government in Mogadishu, however, have been rockier. The UAE previously maintained direct training programs for the Somali National Army and police units, even paying salaries to an estimated 2,000 soldiers until tensions led to a breakdown in cooperation following the seizure of UAE funds at the airport. There has since been only limited reengagement. Abu Dhabi has thus chosen to reposition itself, deepening ties with the autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland, where its support encounters fewer federal restrictions. Collectively, this distributed network of patronage enables the UAE to sustain influence over fragmented political authorities and maintain logistical access to the Gulf of Aden and the broader Red Sea corridor, reinforcing commercial interests and covert military posture. (That UAE-backed forces have control over the islands of Zuqar, Abd al Kuri and Perim comes in handy too.)

For the UAE, the intensification of shadow military operations is driven by a few underlying imperatives. First and most important, it wants its economy to be more than simply an oil economy. To help the transition, Abu Dhabi is looking to use its foreign sovereign funds to aggressively diversify into foreign markets, especially those in Africa. Its focus has been on critical resources (rare earths, gold and other mining operations), port infrastructure networks, logistics corridors and food security projects. Military entrenchments in and around the Red Sea help support and protect these investments.

The UAE is also trying to position itself as a Gulf power, reducing dependence on the U.S. as Washington withdraws somewhat from the Middle East. Regionally, competition with Saudi Arabia increasingly looks to be a motivating factor. Though their interests sometimes align, the two are increasingly supporting rival actors. Their methods for doing so underscore this division; Riyadh prefers formal coalitions and mega-projects, while Abu Dhabi operates in targeted areas using disciplined financial and security arrangements that can secure disproportionate returns. In Yemen and Sudan, the UAE’s support for non-Saudi factions is meant to undermine, and even curb, further Saudi expansion and influence.

Last, the UAE wants to become a sovereign technological and defense innovation hub.

Through cooperation with China on dual-use systems and aerospace technologies, it has become one of the world’s fastest-growing exporters of drones, even as it develops indigenous capabilities in cyber operations and missile systems, and the conflicts in Africa give Abu Dhabi the opportunity to battle-test its equipment. These ventures align with Abu Dhabi’s Vision 2031 agenda, which aspires to position the UAE as a center for advanced manufacturing and defense innovation.

Put simply, the UAE cannot become a conventional military power in a conventional way – not with a mere 1 million citizens. It is therefore trying to become a regional power using its unique strengths: financial support for mercenaries, ports, drones, contractors, “dual-use” humanitarian logistics and, crucially, plausible deniability.

The UAE has built logistical corridors linking its investments and military proxies across Africa and the Red Sea, partnering with local armed actors to shield its economic projects from scrutiny. The massacre in el-Fasher shows that its strategy is not without risks. Still, its forays into Africa and the Red Sea are not impulsive gambles; they constitute a deliberate effort to operate in the gray zone, wielding asymmetric capabilities to safeguard resources, test new technologies and assert geopolitical centrality in an era of declining Western preeminence and rising multipolar competition.

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—END REPORT