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Title: November 10, 2025

GRAY ZONE BRIEF 10 NOVEMBER 2025

DOMESTIC SITREP

HAPPY BIRTHDAY MARINES!!!

(250 Years of Honor, Courage & Commitment)

U.S. DRONES FOR NATO

**A new system to identify and take down Russian drones is being deployed to NATO’s eastern flank** - In response to multiple incursions into NATO airspace allegedly by Russian drones, Poland and Romania are rolling out the U.S.-developed Merops system, which uses artificial intelligence and interceptor drones to detect and neutralize threats. Denmark is also acquiring the technology as part of a broader effort to strengthen the alliance’s eastern border against a rising hybrid-warfare threat.

CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE HACKED

**U.S. Congressional Budget Office Confirms Hack **- The Congressional Budget Office disclosed a cybersecurity breach that potentially exposed sensitive budget-analysis data used by lawmakers. The agency said it has contained the incident, implemented enhanced security measures and is investigating the cause. It did not confirm whether a foreign actor was involved, though some reports suggest this possibility. The breach raises concerns about the integrity of congressional decision-making processes.

GLOBAL SITREP

NEW CHINESE AIRCRAFT CARRIER

**China’s New Aircraft Carrier Signals Naval Ambitions **- China has officially commissioned its newest and most advanced aircraft carrier, the Fujian, marking a major step toward challenging U.S. naval power and modernizing its military. Presided over by President Xi Jinping on Hainan Island on Wednesday, the ceremony highlighted the carrier’s electromagnetic catapult system, a first for China, and similar to that on America’s USS Gerald R. Ford. The Fujian—China’s third carrier and first of near-U.S. scale—displaces over 80,000 tons when fully loaded, and enhances Beijing’s ability to project power. Analysts say it could be used to pressure Taiwan or assert dominance in the South China Sea, though China still faces technological and operational hurdles before matching American carrier capabilities. Beijing is already working on the construction of its fourth carrier.

SOMALI PIRATES

**Somalia: Pirates board fuel tanker, crew reported safe **- Somali pirates boarded the Malta-flagged Hellas Aphrodite on Thursday, marking the first successful hijacking of a commercial vessel off Somalia in more than a year. The attackers, armed with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, targeted the tanker as it traveled from India to South Africa. All 24 crew members secured themselves in the ship’s citadel and were later confirmed safe. Maritime officials warned of a piracy resurgence amid reduced naval patrols and regional instability. An EU warship from Operation Atalanta is responding to the incident.

SUDAN

**Sudan’s paramilitary group agrees on truce proposed by US-led mediator group **- Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces agreed to a three-month humanitarian ceasefire proposed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, signaling willingness to begin broader peace talks. The announcement follows the RSF’s capture of el-Fasher, where reports of mass killings and suspected mass graves have emerged. Sudan’s army has not accepted the truce, demanding RSF withdrawals from key cities. Humanitarian agencies warn famine and displacement are worsening amid the ongoing conflict.

SUDAN’S RSF LABELED AS TERRORISTS

**Sudanese prime minister calls for RSF to be labelled ‘terrorist’ group** - Sudanese Prime Minister Kamil Idris urged the international community to designate the Rapid Support Forces as a terrorist organization, warning that their actions threaten not only Sudan but the stability of Africa and beyond. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Idris condemned the RSF as “mercenaries and rebel militias” responsible for “unprecedented crimes,” including mass killings in Darfur’s el-Fasher. He described the army’s retreat from the city as a tactical move and dismissed reports of famine, insisting Sudan’s military remains capable of reclaiming territory.

UKRAINE UPDATE (as of November 8, 2025)

Key Takeaways:

1. The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction has temporarily slowed but will likely increase again in the coming days as Russian forces extend logistics and bring reinforcements in the area.

2. Russia launched over 500 drones and missiles at Ukraine overnight on November 7 to 8 as it continues its long-range strike campaign against critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of winter 2025-2026.

3. Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Southern Military District (SMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Sanchik as Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics on November 8.

4. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Colonel Yuriy Cherevashenko as the commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Air Defense Systems service on November 7.

5. Russian forces advanced near Pokrovsk.

GZB INFOCUS: OCTOBER ELECTIONS IN AFRICA

October in Africa was rich in elections. In particular: Cameroon (October 12), Côte d’Ivoire (October 25), and Tanzania (October 29). All three cases could be described as races with a predetermined result.

First, in all three countries, the main opposition candidates were barred from participating. In Cameroon, the application of the main opposition candidate Maurice Kamto was rejected due to an alleged double nomination from the same MANIDEM party. Instead, the main rival to the world’s longest-serving president, Paul Biya (43 years in power!), was his former ally Issa Tchiroma Bakary.

In Côte d’Ivoire, Tidjane Thiam from the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire was disqualified over citizenship issues – he took French citizenship 40 years ago, and right before the election, the country’s court ruled that he had lost his Ivorian citizenship upon acquiring the French one, and thus couldn’t run.

In Tanzania, the main opposition leader Tundu Lissu was imprisoned in the spring on charges of treason.

Another common feature – once the main opposition candidates were removed, opposition parties did not rally behind alternative contenders.

As a result, all three leaders – Paul Biya in Cameroon, Alassane Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire, and Samia Suluhu Hassan in Tanzania – remained in power. For Ouattara, this is his fourth term; for Biya, the eighth; and for Suluhu Hassan, the first official one. She became president after the death of John Magufuli, nicknamed “the Bulldozer,” either for his pace of infrastructure projects or for his way of dealing with opponents.

When Suluhu Hassan came to power in 2021, she took several steps toward improving the political climate – unblocking media outlets and releasing political prisoners. There was real hope for democratization in Tanzania. As the elections showed, those hopes were largely misplaced. An interesting episode: a few weeks before the elections, several media outlets were banned for airing a video allegedly insulting the president – it showed stories of people disappearing in the country.

Finally, the post-election situation. The calmest was in Côte d’Ivoire, where all candidates conceded defeat. In Cameroon, Issa Tchiroma Bakary claims he won the election and is now in hiding (reports of his arrest yesterday remain unconfirmed), while protests continue. In Tanzania, protests erupted with a horrifying death toll – around 800, according to the opposition (the UN reports 10, Amnesty International around 100).

That’s how October 2025 looked in Africa – and don’t forget about the coup in Madagascar and the protests in Morocco. There’s also a growing fuel shortage crisis in pro-Russian Mali that may soon lead to unrest – but that’s for another post.

—MOD

(Martha Olniynyk-D’omochko, Ukrainian Analyst contributed this to GRAY ZONE BRIEF.)

*Note: I spoke with Martha on a mutually used platform today about what her focus and research has been lately.

Our conversation was about something deeply serious — how Russia is recruiting Africans to fight in its war.

It’s an important topic to shed light on — exposing the deceptive nature of Russia’s policy in Africa and its attempts to exploit not only natural and political resources but also human lives.

Behind promises of “$2,000 salaries” lies the grim reality of being sent to the frontlines against one’s will. Behind words of “friendship” and “support” hides a desire to extract as much as possible from African nations.

Here are some Key Takeaways from GZB’s research:

• Recruitment tactics: Russia uses social media and local agents to target young, vulnerable people in Africa, often in countries with high unemployment rates. Recruits have reported being manipulated or forced to sign contracts in Russian, a language they don't understand, and having their passports confiscated.

• Numbers: Ukraine's Foreign Minister stated that over 1,400 people from 36 African nations are known to be fighting for Russia, often in "suicidal" military contracts. The exact number is difficult to determine due to a lack of transparency from African governments and Russia.

• Consequences: There have been reports of African nationals being killed or captured as prisoners of war. Some South African citizens trapped in the Donbas region have issued distress calls for help to return home.

• Government response: African governments, including South Africa and Kenya, have warned their citizens about these deceptive recruitment tactics and are working through diplomatic channels to investigate and secure the return of their nationals.

• Other roles: Beyond frontline fighters, some African women have been tricked into working in Russian drone factories under the guise of hospitality or catering jobs.

GZB INFOCUS PART TWO: THE AFRICA - RUSSIA CONNECTION

BLUF: The Africa-Ukraine connection is central to understanding what is happening in Europe now.

The Afrika Corps”, now know and are getting more aggressive across Africa, fomenting coups, taking control of valuable assets and cash flows to finance their operations in Europe. As the former “Chef” Progozin, once put it, Wagner is making Africa “safer for freedom.”

They are also increasingly gathering recruits from Africa and organizing more weaponization of refugees.

Africa is the source of the cash and resources that allow Russia to expand its operations beyond Ukraine into neighboring locations, including the borderlands of Poland, Lithuania, Moldova, and Romania gets control of a wide range of African nations by installing new leaders through coups, or aligning through military agreements, they get access to immense cash flows that no Western sanctions regime can touch.

Russia’s Afrika Corps is now very focused on Africa and behind the new leadership in Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad. Notice that Russia is also working closely with opponents of the current leadership in Sudan and Libya with many African leaders in places like the Central African Republic. Included in this GZB is a map of the various African nations that have signed military agreements with Russia.

Russia has been deepening its commercial ties with North Africa, too, most recently offering to help create and support a North African Free Trade area. Right after the Africa-Russia Summit a few years ago (the second one), President Putin apparently called a Cabinet meeting. It’s reported that “Russia and four North African countries — Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia — were working on a free trade area that would be integrated into the Eurasian Economic Union, an economic bloc comprising Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.”

Notice Wagner’s (Africa Corps) focus on the African nations that have Mediterranean shores.

How do the assets gathered in these red nations on the map above make their way back to Russia? Via the Mediterranean and Crimea or the Mediterranean and overland via Syria and Turkey.

All these routes converge on The Black Sea, which is now between NATO and Russia, especially since the breakdown of the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

To remind everyone, that deal had permitted some 33 million metric tons of food through Ukrainian ports, in spite of the war, according to the UN. Russia was blockading the Black Sea ostensibly to stop supplies and weapons from reaching Ukraine but also to ensure the safe passage of supplies and weapons to Russia.

GZB INFOCUS PART THREE:

Pragmatism Beyond Divides: Central Asian Countries and Afghanistan

Since 2022, the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) have been reevaluating their policies towards Afghanistan. They no longer perceive it primarily as a threat to regional security and stability, but rather as an important partner with whom they are ready to pursue a constructive policy. Cooperation with Kabul is deepening in the areas of energy, trade, infrastructure, and transport.

The countries of the region are also offering humanitarian aid.

The policy towards their southern neighbor is a manifestation of the diversification of the foreign and economic policies of the Central Asian states and their greater openness to cooperation with regional partners. Afghanistan is significant in this context, as it could potentially serve as a gateway to South Asian markets for this part of the world, which would reduce the influence of China and Russia on Central Asian economies. Therefore, the relations between the Central Asian states and Kabul are pragmatic in nature, and in the future, they are likely to further political and diplomatic rapprochement, including recognition of the Afghan authorities.

Regional Strategy for Afghanistan

Maintaining good or satisfactory relations with the government in Kabul is a priority for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. They are currently working to develop a joint strategy in this regard. These countries were among the first to establish relations with the Taliban, who have been internationally isolated since they seized power in 2021. The process of normalizing relations accelerated particularly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Following this event, the Central Asian states began to diversify their foreign relations and devote greater attention to regional integration.

The year 2024 proved particularly significant, as the first ambassador to the region from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) arrived in Uzbekistan, and subsequent Central Asian states removed the Taliban from terrorist lists. In recent years, Central Asian leaders have discussed the Afghan issue both at consultative meetings of the five presidents and in the presence of actors from outside the region. On August 26, the first meeting of the Central Asian Special Representatives for Afghanistan took place in Tashkent (Turkmenistan was absent), during which the parties set the goal of developing a common policy towards Kabul.

Areas of Cooperation

None of the Central Asian countries officially recognizes the Taliban's rule, but most have established political and diplomatic relations with them. Uzbekistan is the most involved, with its policies constituting de facto recognition of the regime without de jure recognition. In August 2024, Uzbekistan's Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov visited Kabul (he remains the highest-ranking politician in his position to make such a visit since the Taliban seized power). Since September 2024, an official IEA ambassador has been resident in Tashkent, a rare occurrence for an officially unrecognized state. Due to close diplomatic cooperation, it can be expected that Uzbekistan will be the first Central Asian country to formally recognize the Taliban.

Furthermore, partnership in energy matters is crucial. One of Turkmenistan's primary goals is the development of the TAPI gas pipeline, which will connect the Galkynysh fields with Herat, and potentially – via Afghan territory – with Pakistan and India. On October 20, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, former president and informally still the country's most important politician, visited Afghanistan to assess the progress of the new phase of TAPI construction. His visit demonstrates that developing relations with that country (especially with regard to the pipeline under construction, a flagship project of the government in Ashgabat) is a priority for Turkmenistan. Furthermore, Afghanistan is a significant consumer of Turkmen electricity (in 2024, 1.8 billion kWh was declared).

Other countries also benefit from energy cooperation with Kabul – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan export electricity to Afghanistan. Water management is also crucial – in May, Afghanistan signed an agreement with Uzbekistan on joint management of the Amu Darya waters. This was a significant step in the development of relations between Kabul and Tashkent. Previously, the construction of the Afghan Kos Tepa Canal, draining water from the Amu Darya, had raised concerns in Uzbekistan due to threats to agriculture.

Prospects and External Constraints

Asian countries are strengthening their relations with the IEA, primarily with concerns about cooperation in the areas of transport and energy, which allows for the diversification of policy and oversight. However, this is likely subject to diplomatic rapprochement and official acceptance by the Taliban government, particularly if an attack on Uzbekistan occurs and the country adopts a separate strategy towards Afghanistan and a easing of Afghan-Tajik relations.

The development of a Central Asian strategy towards the IEA will depend on two external factors. The first is the Afghan-Pakistani tension. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were tense both before and after the Taliban's takeover, leading to the outbreak of conflict on October 9th, directly sparked by accusations that Afghanistan harbored the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in its territory. On October 19th, the parties agreed to a ceasefire, but the situation remains unstable, and peace talks have failed. The fragile ceasefire between Kabul and Islamabad may prove insufficient for the Central Asian states to implement their plans for transport and energy routes leading to the south of the continent. Turkmenistan's ambitions are primarily at risk, as it considers the development of the TAPI gas pipeline crucial, as it depends on peace on the Afghan-Pakistani border. Berdimuhamedow's visit to Afghanistan shortly after the signing of the ceasefire can therefore be seen as a method by which Ashgabat secures its own interests.

The second factor influencing the region's strategy towards Kabul is Russia, which has established official relations with the Taliban and recognized their government. Although Central Asian states also strive to normalize relations with Afghanistan, regional initiatives that do not involve Moscow, such as the C5+1 formats and attempts at intraregional integration, run counter to the interests of the Russian Federation, which seeks to maintain its dominant position in this part of the world. Therefore, Russia is not interested in Central Asian states developing an independent strategy towards Kabul and seeks to coordinate their policies with it in this regard.

(Daria Zielinska, Analyst from the Centre for Eastern

Studies, Poland contributed to this GZB INFOCUS.)

Pray.

Train.

Stay informed.

Build resilient communities.

(Jay Gismondi is from the USA, CEO & Founder of GRAY ZONE BRIEF, and S2 Leader for Team ACSD.)

—END REPORT