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Title: February 20, 2026
GRAY ZONE BRIEF 20
FEBRUARY 2026
U.S. – IRAN
Escalation. Israeli security agencies
have been placed on high alert amid reports that the U.S. is preparing to
launch an attack on Iran. According to Israeli media, signs indicate Israel
would participate in the airstrikes, with action potentially coming within
days. Possible targets for an attack include facilities used by Iran’s
ballistic missile program and institutions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. On Wednesday, Iran issued a notice to air traffic controllers of planned
missile launch exercises on Thursday in the country’s southern regions.
***NOTE: GZB predicts that a strike on
Iran is highly likely this weekend. If the U.S. strikes Iran, they will likely
be surgical strikes on regime leadership, nuclear and missile facilities, naval
assets and ports, IRGC army bases, IRGC intelligence, communications, air
assets and airstrips, as well as other relevant targets and IRGC government
buildings.
RUSSIA & IRAN
More drills. Relatedly, Russia and
Iran conducted naval exercises in the northern Indian Ocean and the Gulf of
Oman on Thursday. Sailors from both countries practiced joint operations to
free a vessel seized by “pirates,” and special operations forces practiced
storming a ship and rescuing the crew.
U.S. & DRC: TANTALUM
New offer. The government of the
Democratic Republic of Congo has added the Rubaya coltan mine to a list of
assets it is offering the U.S. access to under a proposed minerals cooperation
partnership, according to Reuters. The mine has been under the control of M23
rebels since 2024. It accounts for roughly 15 percent of global supplies of
tantalum, a mineral used in both consumer and military electronics.
RUSSIA & IRAQ
Russian recruitment. Iraq is
considering new measures to block recruitment of Iraqis into the Russian army
amid Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine. The plan, proposed by a committee formed
in January to halt enlistment of Iraqi citizens into the Russian military,
would criminalize joining or facilitating the joining of foreign armed forces.
According to Iraqi officials, roughly 5,000 Iraqi citizens have joined the
Russian military, attracted by promises of high pay or Russian citizenship.
NEW ROCKETS FOR THE
HERMIT KINGDOM
Showing off. North Korea displayed its
600 mm multiple rocket launchers during a ceremony in Pyongyang attended by
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The launchers have a range of about 400
kilometers (250 miles) and could now be ready for field deployment, after being
tested in January. The ceremony took place ahead of a party congress during
which Kim has vowed to unveil the country’s new defense capabilities.
U.S. TOTAL WITHDRAWAL
FROM SYRIA
Winding down. The United States will
completely withdraw its approximately 1,000 troops from Syria, ending a
decadelong military presence aimed at combating the Islamic State. The
withdrawal has already begun, with troops having left key strongholds in the
northeast and along the Jordanian and Iraqi borders. The remaining soldiers
will leave the country within two months.
U.S. & UZBEKISTAN:
CRITICAL MINERALS
Central Asia investment. The United
States and Uzbekistan signed a range of economic agreements during Uzbek
President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visit to Washington. The main deal concerns the
use of U.S. technologies in strategic areas of the Uzbek economy, including
exploration, production and supply of critical minerals, as well as the
petrochemical industry. The U.S. Export-Import Bank and the International
Development Finance Corporation will provide financial support for the
projects.
THE EU & NUKES
Condemnation. Belgian Defense Minister
Theo Francken rebuked. European leaders for openly discussing nuclear
deterrence. Francken said on X that Europe's top officials should "keep
their mouths shut" when it comes to their countries’ nuclear strategies.
He made the comments after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in a recent
interview rejected the possibility of Germany developing its own nuclear
deterrent but suggested German fighter jets could carry French or British
nuclear weapons.
U.S. FAR LEFT
INDOCTRINATION
**Far-left activists radicalizing high
school kids to take on ICE as young suspects in agent attack pictured** -
Far-left activists are radicalizing
high school students to take on ICE as cops hunt two youngsters who attacked a
federal officer, the California Post can reveal. ‘Dare To Struggle SoCal’ is
urging children to skip class and “rebel against” agents across major West
Coast cities. It comes a day after an ICE worker was hit by a rock and rushed
to hospital when officers faced off against up to 500 teenagers outside Los
Angeles Metropolitan Detention Center. Dare To Struggle SoCal says its aim is
to crush ICE and end mass deportations across the US by radical action in
Southern California, the Post has learned. Masterminds have mobilized across
social media, with pamphlets being shared calling for help to “melt ICE” and
“smash the mass deportation machine.” California State Superintendent candidate
Sonja Shaw claimed the teacher unions were also involved with the plot and
slammed the use of kids as “pawns.”
**NOTE: ** This is an example of how
asymmetric warfare contributes to terror activities. Also note the lack of
reporting on this across other media.
U.S. DECISION MAKING
**Confidence, Interoperability, and
the Limits of U.S. Decision Systems**
The United States is losing cognitive
advantage not because it lacks data or expertise, but because it lacks
decision-making architecture that reliably learns, calibrates confidence, and
adapts in complex environments. Masoud Andarabi, former Minister of Interior of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, contends that in Gray Zone conflicts, U.S.
institutions routinely project high confidence that is structurally
miscalibrated, as seen in Afghanistan and echoed in domestic governance
reforms. Without systems that integrate feedback, track failed assumptions, and
ask the right questions about influence and legitimacy, confidence becomes an
illusion rather than a strategic asset.
MENTOCIDE: MIND RAPE
**War on Minds: Artificial
Intelligence and the Information Environment** -
The use of generative Artificial
Intelligence (AI) is transforming the information environment to such an extent
that the various social, cultural, linguistic, and psychological inputs that
humans use to make sense of what they see and subsequently act upon have become
increasingly synthetic, AI-generated, or edited, and bot-disseminated. A crisis
in authenticity in which internet users are increasingly unable to discern the
source of a piece of content, nor its integrity or veracity, is having unprecedented
ramifications, including in the security and geopolitical domains. The
overarching effect of an information environment in which it is almost
impossible to discern the authenticity and veracity of content is not just an
issue of the spread of false narratives. It indicates something more profoundly
about how states and non-state actors seek to interfere: while AI-facilitated
information operations can serve to push specific narratives, they also cause
the ideal, chaotic, and unintelligent environment to confuse people to such an
extent that they do not believe anything anymore, regardless of source.
GZB INFOCUS: U.S. -
CHINA RELATIONS
On Monday, U.S. President Donald Trump
said he was discussing the issue of arms sales to Taiwan with his Chinese
counterpart, a very strategically telling development in U.S.-China relations.
The statement suggests that the supply of U.S. weapons to Taiwan, long handled
as routine bureaucratic transfers under the Taiwan Relations Act, may now be
subject to top-level negotiations between Washington and Beijing. Emphasizing
his “good relationship” with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Trump said a
decision on arms sales would come “pretty soon.”
For decades, China has attempted to
make the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship part of its own bilateral
negotiations with the United States. Beijing has repeatedly warned that U.S.
arms transfers to Taiwan must be handled “with prudence,” and in recent weeks,
it has mentioned previous American approvals – such as the $11 billion package
authorized in December – as justification for large-scale Chinese military
drills around the self-ruled island. Amid reports that Washington is
considering a new and potentially larger package for Taiwan, the message from
Beijing is clear: Delay or downsize the potential arms sale, or efforts to
stabilize U.S.-China relations will suffer.
The White House is taking China’s
warning seriously. As the costs of unmanaged escalation continue to rise, both
sides are increasingly convinced that some form of accommodation is necessary.
In Washington, lawmakers from Trump’s Republican Party are concerned that the
combination of tariff disruptions, market volatility and supply chain fragility
from trade tensions with Beijing could cost them in November midterm elections.
For Beijing, slower growth, persistent distress in the real estate sector, demographic
headwinds and shaky investor sentiment have restricted the government’s room to
maneuver. Stabilizing relations with the U.S. is therefore not just desirable
but critical to sparking a much-needed economic rebound. Thus, the mutual need
for predictability has begun to outweigh the (mostly symbolic) gains of
continued confrontation.
The current state of play could be
characterized as a fragile trade truce. Last week, the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce confirmed for the first time in months that economic and trade teams
from both countries were engaged in sustained dialogue at multiple levels.
Around the same time, senior U.S. Treasury officials traveled to China to
prepare for the next round of high-level talks, with U.S. Treasury Secretary
Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng serving as principal
negotiators. The likely outcome of these engagements is not a major reset of
the relationship but rather a series of tactical agreements: agricultural
purchases, limited tariff adjustments, selective regulatory concessions and
reaffirmations of “mutual respect.” For now, stability is the name of the game,
especially with Trump planning to visit China in April.
The Taiwan Question:
Still, even as economic channels
reopen, the Taiwan question remains the main geopolitical obstacle to lasting
rapprochement. For Beijing, Taiwan is connected to sovereignty, regime
legitimacy (which is especially significant in times of economic strain) and
the long-standing narrative of national rejuvenation. For Washington, the
island represents credibility, deterrence and the defense of a democratic
partner.
Therefore, any U.S.-China
accommodation needs to include some sort of understanding regarding Taiwan,
even if no formal agreement is signed. Strategic ambiguity has long proved to
be functional – it allowed Washington to support Taiwan without formally recognizing
independence, and also let Beijing postpone forcible reunification while
maintaining pressure on the island. However, the increase in Chinese military
signaling – air incursions, naval patrols and exercises – suggests that
ambiguity and the current fragile status quo alone may no longer provide
sufficient stability. The pending arms sales decision therefore serves as a
test case for how deterrence will be recalibrated within a framework of renewed
dialogue.
Taiwan’s domestic political situation
adds another element of complexity. President Lai Ching-te’s Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) lost control of the legislature in the 2024 elections,
leaving the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party with procedural
leverage. The repeated blocking of Lai’s $39.5 billion special defense budget
has become a symbol of this divided government. Although Taiwan has the fiscal
capacity to fund the package – supported by a strong credit rating, prudent
fiscal management and even recent tax surpluses – the issue lies in mistrust
between the two main parties and legislative maneuvering. The opposition has
argued for scaling back or restructuring the plan, while the DPP considers it
essential for asymmetric deterrence and alignment with U.S. security
expectations. Polls indicate that a majority of citizens view the obstruction
unfavorably, but public dissatisfaction has not translated into legislative
compromise.
The intragovernmental discord does not
end there. After Lai’s Cabinet refused to sign a bill that would allocate a
greater share of tax revenues to local governments, the opposition initiated
impeachment proceedings against Lai despite lacking the supermajority required
for success, reflecting a strategy of sustained political pressure.
Constitutional obstacles make Lai’s
removal highly unlikely, but the process itself reinforces an image of
institutional gridlock. At a time when Beijing continues military pressure and
Washington is recalibrating its diplomatic approach, this paralysis can be
strategically damaging. It raises questions both within the country and
internationally about Taiwan’s ability to reach some kind of consensus between
the leadership and the opposition in the face of an external threat. Even more
important, it heightens public anxiety that Taiwan’s future could be influenced
by great-power bargaining taking place above its head.
Simultaneously, the KMT’s engagement
with Beijing has intensified. The revival of the KMT-Chinese Communist Party
forum after a decade and reaffirmation of the “1992 Consensus” (a framework
formulated between the People’s Republic of China and the then-KMT-led Taiwan
to manage cross-strait relations) highlight alternative channels of
cross-strait communication that bypass the DPP-led government. Beijing is
likely to leverage these ties to signal that cooperation – and perhaps
deescalation – is easier under KMT leadership. At the same time, KMT Chairwoman
Cheng Li-wun has been invited to visit the U.S., positioning her as a potential
intermediary between both capitals. For the KMT, this approach offers the
possibility of reducing miscalculation, yet it also fuels domestic fears of
overly accommodating Beijing.
Accommodation between the U.S. and
China is possible regardless of which party is ruling in Taiwan. The difference
between a DPP- and KMT-led government lies mainly in tone and execution. A DPP
administration prioritizes deterrence and sovereignty, aligning closely with
traditional U.S. security logic but also risking conflict if Washington seeks
trade concessions with Beijing. In contrast, a KMT administration emphasizes
engagement and economic integration with China, potentially lowering immediate
tensions but likely also raising some concerns about strategic vulnerability.
Taiwan’s electorate, which largely favors maintaining the status quo, remains
wary of both extremes.
Taiwan’s Immediate
Future:
Trump’s arms sales decision will serve
as an early but significant indicator of how far Washington and Beijing are
willing to go in balancing deterrence with diplomatic stabilization. Any
understanding on Taiwan will almost certainly remain tacit, for now
demonstrated only by calibrated weapons transfers and moderated military
signaling rather than formal commitments. Over the coming months, the Taiwan
issue will likely be subsumed into a renewed great-power understanding.
If the two sides continue moving
toward rapprochement through economic and diplomatic channels, as a major step
in the Taiwan issue, they may reach a tacit agreement to avoid dramatic moves
that alter the status quo. Washington would maintain arms support at a lower
level sufficient for deterrence but tailored to avoid overt provocation, while
Beijing would continue applying pressure but take it to a lower level to avoid
escalation. That kind of balance would not eliminate tension, but it could
reduce the probability of miscalculation. For now, the weight of mutual
economic dependence and political calculation suggests that both Washington and
Beijing are moving, cautiously but deliberately, toward stabilization.
Pray.
Train.
Stay informed.
Be prepared to respond
and recover.
No One Is Coming. It’s
Up To Us.
—END REPORT
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