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Title: February 20, 2026

GRAY ZONE BRIEF 20 FEBRUARY 2026
 
U.S. – IRAN
 
Escalation. Israeli security agencies have been placed on high alert amid reports that the U.S. is preparing to launch an attack on Iran. According to Israeli media, signs indicate Israel would participate in the airstrikes, with action potentially coming within days. Possible targets for an attack include facilities used by Iran’s ballistic missile program and institutions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On Wednesday, Iran issued a notice to air traffic controllers of planned missile launch exercises on Thursday in the country’s southern regions.
 
***NOTE: GZB predicts that a strike on Iran is highly likely this weekend. If the U.S. strikes Iran, they will likely be surgical strikes on regime leadership, nuclear and missile facilities, naval assets and ports, IRGC army bases, IRGC intelligence, communications, air assets and airstrips, as well as other relevant targets and IRGC government buildings.
 
RUSSIA & IRAN
 
More drills. Relatedly, Russia and Iran conducted naval exercises in the northern Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman on Thursday. Sailors from both countries practiced joint operations to free a vessel seized by “pirates,” and special operations forces practiced storming a ship and rescuing the crew.
 
U.S. & DRC: TANTALUM
 
New offer. The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo has added the Rubaya coltan mine to a list of assets it is offering the U.S. access to under a proposed minerals cooperation partnership, according to Reuters. The mine has been under the control of M23 rebels since 2024. It accounts for roughly 15 percent of global supplies of tantalum, a mineral used in both consumer and military electronics.
 
RUSSIA & IRAQ
 
Russian recruitment. Iraq is considering new measures to block recruitment of Iraqis into the Russian army amid Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine. The plan, proposed by a committee formed in January to halt enlistment of Iraqi citizens into the Russian military, would criminalize joining or facilitating the joining of foreign armed forces. According to Iraqi officials, roughly 5,000 Iraqi citizens have joined the Russian military, attracted by promises of high pay or Russian citizenship.
 
NEW ROCKETS FOR THE HERMIT KINGDOM
 
Showing off. North Korea displayed its 600 mm multiple rocket launchers during a ceremony in Pyongyang attended by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The launchers have a range of about 400 kilometers (250 miles) and could now be ready for field deployment, after being tested in January. The ceremony took place ahead of a party congress during which Kim has vowed to unveil the country’s new defense capabilities.
 
U.S. TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIA
 
Winding down. The United States will completely withdraw its approximately 1,000 troops from Syria, ending a decadelong military presence aimed at combating the Islamic State. The withdrawal has already begun, with troops having left key strongholds in the northeast and along the Jordanian and Iraqi borders. The remaining soldiers will leave the country within two months.
 
U.S. & UZBEKISTAN: CRITICAL MINERALS
 
Central Asia investment. The United States and Uzbekistan signed a range of economic agreements during Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visit to Washington. The main deal concerns the use of U.S. technologies in strategic areas of the Uzbek economy, including exploration, production and supply of critical minerals, as well as the petrochemical industry. The U.S. Export-Import Bank and the International Development Finance Corporation will provide financial support for the projects.
 
THE EU & NUKES
 
Condemnation. Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken rebuked. European leaders for openly discussing nuclear deterrence. Francken said on X that Europe's top officials should "keep their mouths shut" when it comes to their countries’ nuclear strategies. He made the comments after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in a recent interview rejected the possibility of Germany developing its own nuclear deterrent but suggested German fighter jets could carry French or British nuclear weapons.
 
U.S. FAR LEFT INDOCTRINATION
 
**Far-left activists radicalizing high school kids to take on ICE as young suspects in agent attack pictured** -
 
Far-left activists are radicalizing high school students to take on ICE as cops hunt two youngsters who attacked a federal officer, the California Post can reveal. ‘Dare To Struggle SoCal’ is urging children to skip class and “rebel against” agents across major West Coast cities. It comes a day after an ICE worker was hit by a rock and rushed to hospital when officers faced off against up to 500 teenagers outside Los Angeles Metropolitan Detention Center. Dare To Struggle SoCal says its aim is to crush ICE and end mass deportations across the US by radical action in Southern California, the Post has learned. Masterminds have mobilized across social media, with pamphlets being shared calling for help to “melt ICE” and “smash the mass deportation machine.” California State Superintendent candidate Sonja Shaw claimed the teacher unions were also involved with the plot and slammed the use of kids as “pawns.”
 
**NOTE: ** This is an example of how asymmetric warfare contributes to terror activities. Also note the lack of reporting on this across other media.
 
U.S. DECISION MAKING
 
**Confidence, Interoperability, and the Limits of U.S. Decision Systems**
 
The United States is losing cognitive advantage not because it lacks data or expertise, but because it lacks decision-making architecture that reliably learns, calibrates confidence, and adapts in complex environments. Masoud Andarabi, former Minister of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, contends that in Gray Zone conflicts, U.S. institutions routinely project high confidence that is structurally miscalibrated, as seen in Afghanistan and echoed in domestic governance reforms. Without systems that integrate feedback, track failed assumptions, and ask the right questions about influence and legitimacy, confidence becomes an illusion rather than a strategic asset.
 
MENTOCIDE: MIND RAPE
 
**War on Minds: Artificial Intelligence and the Information Environment** -
 
The use of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) is transforming the information environment to such an extent that the various social, cultural, linguistic, and psychological inputs that humans use to make sense of what they see and subsequently act upon have become increasingly synthetic, AI-generated, or edited, and bot-disseminated. A crisis in authenticity in which internet users are increasingly unable to discern the source of a piece of content, nor its integrity or veracity, is having unprecedented ramifications, including in the security and geopolitical domains. The overarching effect of an information environment in which it is almost impossible to discern the authenticity and veracity of content is not just an issue of the spread of false narratives. It indicates something more profoundly about how states and non-state actors seek to interfere: while AI-facilitated information operations can serve to push specific narratives, they also cause the ideal, chaotic, and unintelligent environment to confuse people to such an extent that they do not believe anything anymore, regardless of source.
 
GZB INFOCUS: U.S. - CHINA RELATIONS
 
On Monday, U.S. President Donald Trump said he was discussing the issue of arms sales to Taiwan with his Chinese counterpart, a very strategically telling development in U.S.-China relations. The statement suggests that the supply of U.S. weapons to Taiwan, long handled as routine bureaucratic transfers under the Taiwan Relations Act, may now be subject to top-level negotiations between Washington and Beijing. Emphasizing his “good relationship” with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Trump said a decision on arms sales would come “pretty soon.”
 
For decades, China has attempted to make the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship part of its own bilateral negotiations with the United States. Beijing has repeatedly warned that U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan must be handled “with prudence,” and in recent weeks, it has mentioned previous American approvals – such as the $11 billion package authorized in December – as justification for large-scale Chinese military drills around the self-ruled island. Amid reports that Washington is considering a new and potentially larger package for Taiwan, the message from Beijing is clear: Delay or downsize the potential arms sale, or efforts to stabilize U.S.-China relations will suffer.
 
The White House is taking China’s warning seriously. As the costs of unmanaged escalation continue to rise, both sides are increasingly convinced that some form of accommodation is necessary. In Washington, lawmakers from Trump’s Republican Party are concerned that the combination of tariff disruptions, market volatility and supply chain fragility from trade tensions with Beijing could cost them in November midterm elections. For Beijing, slower growth, persistent distress in the real estate sector, demographic headwinds and shaky investor sentiment have restricted the government’s room to maneuver. Stabilizing relations with the U.S. is therefore not just desirable but critical to sparking a much-needed economic rebound. Thus, the mutual need for predictability has begun to outweigh the (mostly symbolic) gains of continued confrontation.
 
The current state of play could be characterized as a fragile trade truce. Last week, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce confirmed for the first time in months that economic and trade teams from both countries were engaged in sustained dialogue at multiple levels. Around the same time, senior U.S. Treasury officials traveled to China to prepare for the next round of high-level talks, with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng serving as principal negotiators. The likely outcome of these engagements is not a major reset of the relationship but rather a series of tactical agreements: agricultural purchases, limited tariff adjustments, selective regulatory concessions and reaffirmations of “mutual respect.” For now, stability is the name of the game, especially with Trump planning to visit China in April.
 
The Taiwan Question:
 
Still, even as economic channels reopen, the Taiwan question remains the main geopolitical obstacle to lasting rapprochement. For Beijing, Taiwan is connected to sovereignty, regime legitimacy (which is especially significant in times of economic strain) and the long-standing narrative of national rejuvenation. For Washington, the island represents credibility, deterrence and the defense of a democratic partner.
 
Therefore, any U.S.-China accommodation needs to include some sort of understanding regarding Taiwan, even if no formal agreement is signed. Strategic ambiguity has long proved to be functional – it allowed Washington to support Taiwan without formally recognizing independence, and also let Beijing postpone forcible reunification while maintaining pressure on the island. However, the increase in Chinese military signaling – air incursions, naval patrols and exercises – suggests that ambiguity and the current fragile status quo alone may no longer provide sufficient stability. The pending arms sales decision therefore serves as a test case for how deterrence will be recalibrated within a framework of renewed dialogue.
 
Taiwan’s domestic political situation adds another element of complexity. President Lai Ching-te’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost control of the legislature in the 2024 elections, leaving the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party with procedural leverage. The repeated blocking of Lai’s $39.5 billion special defense budget has become a symbol of this divided government. Although Taiwan has the fiscal capacity to fund the package – supported by a strong credit rating, prudent fiscal management and even recent tax surpluses – the issue lies in mistrust between the two main parties and legislative maneuvering. The opposition has argued for scaling back or restructuring the plan, while the DPP considers it essential for asymmetric deterrence and alignment with U.S. security expectations. Polls indicate that a majority of citizens view the obstruction unfavorably, but public dissatisfaction has not translated into legislative compromise.
 
The intragovernmental discord does not end there. After Lai’s Cabinet refused to sign a bill that would allocate a greater share of tax revenues to local governments, the opposition initiated impeachment proceedings against Lai despite lacking the supermajority required for success, reflecting a strategy of sustained political pressure.
 
Constitutional obstacles make Lai’s removal highly unlikely, but the process itself reinforces an image of institutional gridlock. At a time when Beijing continues military pressure and Washington is recalibrating its diplomatic approach, this paralysis can be strategically damaging. It raises questions both within the country and internationally about Taiwan’s ability to reach some kind of consensus between the leadership and the opposition in the face of an external threat. Even more important, it heightens public anxiety that Taiwan’s future could be influenced by great-power bargaining taking place above its head.
 
Simultaneously, the KMT’s engagement with Beijing has intensified. The revival of the KMT-Chinese Communist Party forum after a decade and reaffirmation of the “1992 Consensus” (a framework formulated between the People’s Republic of China and the then-KMT-led Taiwan to manage cross-strait relations) highlight alternative channels of cross-strait communication that bypass the DPP-led government. Beijing is likely to leverage these ties to signal that cooperation – and perhaps deescalation – is easier under KMT leadership. At the same time, KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun has been invited to visit the U.S., positioning her as a potential intermediary between both capitals. For the KMT, this approach offers the possibility of reducing miscalculation, yet it also fuels domestic fears of overly accommodating Beijing.
 
Accommodation between the U.S. and China is possible regardless of which party is ruling in Taiwan. The difference between a DPP- and KMT-led government lies mainly in tone and execution. A DPP administration prioritizes deterrence and sovereignty, aligning closely with traditional U.S. security logic but also risking conflict if Washington seeks trade concessions with Beijing. In contrast, a KMT administration emphasizes engagement and economic integration with China, potentially lowering immediate tensions but likely also raising some concerns about strategic vulnerability. Taiwan’s electorate, which largely favors maintaining the status quo, remains wary of both extremes.
 
Taiwan’s Immediate Future:
 
Trump’s arms sales decision will serve as an early but significant indicator of how far Washington and Beijing are willing to go in balancing deterrence with diplomatic stabilization. Any understanding on Taiwan will almost certainly remain tacit, for now demonstrated only by calibrated weapons transfers and moderated military signaling rather than formal commitments. Over the coming months, the Taiwan issue will likely be subsumed into a renewed great-power understanding.
 
If the two sides continue moving toward rapprochement through economic and diplomatic channels, as a major step in the Taiwan issue, they may reach a tacit agreement to avoid dramatic moves that alter the status quo. Washington would maintain arms support at a lower level sufficient for deterrence but tailored to avoid overt provocation, while Beijing would continue applying pressure but take it to a lower level to avoid escalation. That kind of balance would not eliminate tension, but it could reduce the probability of miscalculation. For now, the weight of mutual economic dependence and political calculation suggests that both Washington and Beijing are moving, cautiously but deliberately, toward stabilization.
 
Pray.
 
Train.
 
Stay informed.
 
Be prepared to respond and recover.
 
No One Is Coming. It’s Up To Us.
 
 
—END REPORT
 
 

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